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Implied Rights Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 - Federal Jurisdiction - Exclusive
or Concurrent?
P REVENTION of "inequitable and unfair practices" 1 in the trad-
ing of securities was the avowed purpose of Congress when
it enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 To implement this
policy of preventive protection, Congress provided within the Act
two methods of enforcement. The primary method was the crea-
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which has
the duty of carrying out the overall functions of the Act.3 To sup-
plement SEC administrative action, Congress included in the Act a
number of provisions granting express individual private rights of
action for violation of the Act. Such privately actionable violations
include section 9(e),4 unlawful manipulation of securities prices,
section 16(b), 5 recovery of short-swing profits derived by corpo-
rate insiders, and section 18 (a),6 damages for reliance upon mislead-
ing statements causing the injured party either to buy or sell securi-
ties at prices affected by such statements. As the SEC proceeded
with its monumental regulatory task, it became evident that the ex-
isting enforcement of the Act was inadequate to handle the variety
of "inequitable and unfair practices." Consequently, the lower fed-
eral courts began to "imply" in private individuals the right to
bring actions for violations of provisions in the Act previously within
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Preamble, 48 Star 881 [hereinafter cited as
Exchange Act].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
8 Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1964). The SEC has broad powers to in-
vestigate possible violations and to hold hearings. It may also seek to enjoin sus-
pected violations or transmit evidence to the Attorney General for criminal action.
Exchange Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1964). See generally Symposium - The
Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEo. WASHL L RLEV. 1 (1959); Note,
SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HARv, L. REV. 769 (1946);
Note, Investigatory Powers of the Securities and Exchaige Commission, 44 YALE LJ.
819 (1935). The Act also provides criminal penalties for willful violations. Exchange
Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964); see Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L. REV. 139 (1934).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964).
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the exclusive province of the SEC.7 This development continued
even though no express provision within the Act alluded to the
right of any private individual to bring such an action. In 1964,
the Supreme Court, in 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak,8 firmly established
the granting of implied rights as a new means of meeting the con-
tinued demands of investor protection in the trading of securities.
Presently, the overwhelming majority of implied actions are brought
under section 14(a),' which concerns the regulation of proxies, and
section 10(b),10 which attempts to prevent the use of manipulative
or deceptive practices in the purchase or sale of securities.
With the creation of these implied rights, an interesting and
complex jurisdictional question arises. Section 27 of the Act states:
"The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of vio-
Vfhe first recognized case to acknowledge this right was Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (motion to dismiss), 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (on the merits). The plaintiff in this case sought redress based on SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), which was promulgated under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). The defendant moved to dismiss the
action for failure to state a claim, noting that section 10(b) provided no right for a
private individual to bring such an action. The court denied the motion stating: "in
view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for
civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies." 69 F. Supp.
at 514. The court came to this conclusion relying on the familiar statutory tort doc-
trine which says that whenever a public statute makes certain conduct wrongful, that
conduct may provide the basis for a private civil action. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act); Lown-
des, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914). For a
closer examination of the development of implied rights under the Exchange Act, see
Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cit. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), noted in 38 VA. L. REV. 232 (1952); 2 L. Loss, SECUI-
TIES REGULATION 932 (2d ed. 1961); Note, New Civil Liabilities Under Securities
and Exchange Act Rules, 14 U. CHi. L. REV. 471 (1947); Note, Implied Liability
Under Securities Exchange Act, 61 HARv. L. REv. 858 (1948); Comment, Private
Rights and Federal Remedies: Herein of J. L Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1150
(1965).
8 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
9 Section 14(a) of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to
solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other
than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
10 Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe .... 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
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lations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabil-
ity or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there-
under."" ' While this jurisdictional grant clearly gives the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought to enforce express
rights created under the Act, a more complex question is whether
section 27 requires that implied private rights of action be litigated
solely in the federal district courts. Specifically, is the implied
right of action a suit in equity or action at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this Act?
I. THE IMPLIED RIGHT AND SECTION 27
A. The Position of the Modern Courts
The question of whether an implied private right of action is a
suit in equity or action at law to enforce any liability or duty
created by the Act has received little comprehensive analysis by
modern courts. Presently, there is both state and federal authority
indicating that the private right may be alleged only in a federal
court.' Without examining the nature of the implied right or the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction, these courts simply reason that such
actions fall within section 27 because the words "liability or duty
created by" encompass implied as well as express rights granted
under the Act.' 3  Such reasoning is beyond dispute only if it is as-
sumed that the implied right of action constitutes merely the appli-
cation of a remedy already existing within the Act.'4 However, ab-
11 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) (emphasis added).
22 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968) (semble). For state court
decisions, see McCollum v. Billings, 53 Misc. 2d 661, 663-66, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609,
613-17 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Mekrut v. Gould, 16 Misc. 2d 326, 188 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
13 The recent New York cases exemplify this judidal direction. See Gallo v.
Mayer, 50 Misc. 2d 385, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Cr. 1966), af'd mem., 272 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (1966); Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 251 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup. Cr. 1964);
White v. Ludwig, 32 Misc. 2d 120, 223 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1961), afJ'd mem.,
253 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1964).
14 For many years it has been asserted that the implied right of action was "sub-
sumed" in the term "liability" under sections 14(a) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Pointing to the inveterate common law theory that a party injured by violators of a
criminal statute has an implied cause of action in negligence, the proponents of this
position contend that an implied right of action for violations of the Exchange Act are
presumed to be included within the Act since the legislation is prohibitory in nature.
The argument concludes that the drafters of the Act, particularly the legislative service
drafters, thought it unnecessary to manifest their intent to incorporate the implied pri-
vate right actions as liabilities created by the Act, since the crime-tort theory was well
established in 1934. The fact that the courts have never given judicial approbation
1969]
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sent this initial assumption, it is questionable whether the exclusive
jurisdiction requirement of section 27 was meant to include implied
right claims, especially in light of the pronouncements in 1.I. Case
Co. v. Borak.'5  Assuming that the implied right was created by a
source other than the Exchange Act, it follows that exclusive federal
jurisdiction need not be necessarily required and that concurrent
jurisdiction might be equally possible. The question raised, then,
is whether the modern courts' interpretation is dictated by the legis-
lative history of section 27 or by the evolution of the implied right.
B, The Legislative Intent
The exclusive jurisdiction requirement contained in the Exchange
Act is in direct contrast to the grant of concurrent jurisdiction in the
Securities Act of 193318 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.'7
It would therefore appear that Congress had a specific purpose for
enacting section 27. Unfortunately, the legislative history surround-
ing the enactment of section 27 manifests little or no evidence of
any congressional purpose for requiring exclusive jurisdiction. Con-
gress enacted the recommendation of a conference committee which,
for no apparent reason, chose to adopt the House version of the
section' 8 rather than the Senate's. The proposed Senate version
had not included the words "exclusive jurisdiction."' 9  Absent a
specific congressional intent for incorporating exclusive jurisdiction
into the Act, two possible reasons exist to explain its inclusion:
Either the provision was included without careful consideration
and conscious intent, or Congress impliedly felt that the policy of
the Act could best be implemented by the federal courts acting
alone.20
An examination of existing related securities legislation renders
the latter possibility doubtful. The theory that Congress felt the
federal courts alone could best implement the Act's policy is pre-
mised upon the need for uniformity in the regulatory field. As the
degree and complexity of regulation increases, so does the need for
to this theory has not served to dampen the enthusiasm or certitude of its advocates.
See 2 L Loss, supra note 7, at 933-42; 5 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 2880-87 (Supp. 1969).
15 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1964).
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1964).
18 78 CoNG. REC. 8099 (1934).
19 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934).
20 Professor Loss adverted to the unrevealing legislative history: "[I] f the silence
of the statute does not justify the conclusion that the legislature affirmatively 'intended'
that there should be a private remedy, neither does it justify that Congress had the
contrary 'intention.' " 2 L. LosS, supra note 7, at 942.
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uniformity of interpretation and enforcement. Also relevant is the
expertise of the judicial system charged with handling complicated
regulation problems. Both of these considerations are minimized
in the securities field to the extent that Congress provided for con-
current state and federal jurisdiction in both the Securities Act of
193321 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.22 Admittedly,
the Exchange Act is more regulatory than the Securities Act,2 but
the Investment Company Act is the most regulatory of all the secu-
rities laws. 24 It would seem that if Congress intended to promote
uniform regulation within the securities field, it would have required
exclusive jurisdiction in the Investment Company Act. The fact
that Congress granted concurrent jurisdiction in both the Securities
Act and the Investment Company Act is also evidence that it did not
lack confidence in the competency of state courts to handle securi-
ties matters.25
An examination of the legislative history and related legislation
reveals a distinct lack of congressional purpose for incorporating
the exclusive jurisdiction requirement into the Exchange Act. The
most plausible conclusion seems to be that the provision was incor-
porated into the Act with little conscious purpose. The position
adopted by the lower courts, that the implied right is restricted by
the exclusive jurisdiction requirement of section 27, is neither sup-
ported nor controverted by an examination of the legislative intent.
Thirty-five years after the Exchange Act was drafted, doubts have
been raised as to whether the exclusivity required by section 27 is
equally applicable to implied right actions created by the courts.
C. Nature of the Implied Right
Because I.I. Case Co. v. Borak2" represents the Supreme Court's
attempt to develop the principles inherent in the implied right, it is
21 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964).
22 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1964).
2 3 It has been called "more technical, [containing] some provisions.. . which go
much further beyond the common law than anything in the 1933 Act." 2 L. Loss,
supra note 7, at 997. For closer examination and analysis of these Acts, see 1 L. Loss,
supra note 7, at 129; James, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 32 AMc. L. REV. 624
(1934); MacChesney & Tracy, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MIcH. L. REV.
1025 (1934); Symposium, supra note 3; Note, A Discussion of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 20 NoTRE DAME LAw. 304 (1945).
24 See Bosland, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 49 J. PoL. EcoN. 477
(1941).
25 The only federal courts which can claim expertise in the securities field are the
New York courts. Excluding the New York courts, the state and federal courts do not
seem to differ in their ability to handle securities questions.
26 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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naturally the source for interpreting the nature of the right. Suit
was brought in Borak by a shareholder based on diversity jurisdic-
tion to enjoin a proposed merger between J.I. Case Co. and Ameri-
can Tractor Corp. on grounds that the merger had been effected
through use of false and misleading proxy statements in violation
of SEC Rule 14a-927 (promulgated under section 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act) and in contravention of the directors' fidu-
ciary duty under state law. The federal district court held that it
had jurisdiction to consider the private action, but that such juris-
diction was limited to declaratory relief under Rule 14a-9. The
Supreme Court, in holding that the federal courts could not only
recognize the right to bring the action but could also grant any nec-
essary corrective relief, maintained that it was merely fashioning
"federal law where federal rights are concerned. ' 28  The decision
is closely analogous to the jurisdictional principle enunciated in
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,29 wherein the
Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction to fashion a rem-
edy based upon the policy of a federal labor statute. In adopting
the Lincoln Mills rationale, the Borak Court expressly rejected an
earlier lower court opinion, Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp.,0
which held that rescissional relief pursuant to an action under section
14(a) of the Act was not contemplated by Congress.
By following Lincoln Mills without extensive explanation, the
real significance of the Court's decision may have gone unnoticed.
Although Lincoln Mills appears to be adequate precedent for the
proposition cited in Borak, there is one critical difference be-
tween the two cases that provides an insight into the innovative prin-
ciple created by the Borak Court. The difference is in the statutory
sections involved in the two cases. Section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, interpreted by the Lincoln Mills Court,
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969).
28 377 U.S. at 434, citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 457 (1957).
29 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The union brought suit in this case to compel arbitra-
tion required in a collective bargaining agreement. The action was based on section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act which provides for suits for violation of
"'contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce .... " 29 U.S.C. § 185a (1964).
30 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961). The plaintiff in this case sought to have an
intercorporate "arrangement" declared void and rescinded, alleging that the necessary
two-thirds majority approval had been obtained through a solicitation of proxies which
violated section 14(a) of the Act, and that the ballots had been inaccurately counted in
violation of state law. See Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Private Investor Has
Private Right of Action Under Section 14(a), 1962 DUKE L.J. 151.
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grants an express right to bring "suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization representing employ-
ees."'31 Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 2 interpreted by the
Borak Court, makes no mention of any right of private action for a
violation. Thus, it can be argued that while the Court in Lincoln
Mills fashioned only a rule of decision for an already existing right
of action, the Borak Court fashioned both a right of action and a
rule of decision from a mere statutory prohibition.
An examination of the Borak opinion suggests two possible in-
terpretations as to the nature of the implied right. It is arguable
that the implied right of action is a creature of the courts and that
"private enforcement of the Exchange Act provides a necessary sup-
plement to Commission action."33  A second, and less plausible
argument is that the implied right of Borak is merely a remedial
vehicle applicable only to the statutory mandate which gave it birth
and operative only within the confines of that statute. Although
it is difficult to determine which interpretation is correct, the first
explanation finds more support in the Borak opinion. While the
language in Borak is ambiguous, and while it is arguable that the
Court concluded that the implied right of action is governed by
section 27, the Court's position on the source of the right seems
clear: "We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." 35
Since 1964, several lower courts have read Borak as specifically
holding the judiciary to be the source of the implied right.36  In
3129 U.S.C. § 185a (1964).
32 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
33377 U.S. at 433.
34 Addressing itself to the jurisdictional basis for the action, the Court stated:
It appears clear that the private parties have a right under § 27 to bring suit
for violation of § 14(a) of the Act. Indeed, this specifically grants the ap-
propriate District Courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created" under the Act. 377 U.S.
at 430-31.
Since defendant Borak sought only federal jurisdiction based on diversity grounds
and on the exclusive jurisdiction requirement of section 27, it would seem that the
above statement is not dispositive of the question.
35 377 U.S. at 433. There is ample language in the opinion to support this inter-
pretation: Although the language of 14(a) "makes no specific reference to a private
right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly
implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." Id. at
432. See generally 5 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 2882 (Supp. 1969).
36 See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), holding
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determining whether punitive damages could be awarded in an im-
plied right action under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, the
court in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., stated:
Yet the violation of that section [17(a)], like a violation of § 10
(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act, is recognized as giving rise, under
basic common law tort principles, to civil liability in favor of those
intended to be protected by the statute .... 37
The Tenth Circuit, in Esplin v. Hirschi,38 stated that the Borak opin-
ion indicated that the same common law tort principles should be
applied under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
If these courts are correct and the source of the implied private
right is judicial rather than statutory, the exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion mandate of section 27 would not encompass the implied right,
and such claims could also be instituted in state court. Implicit in
such reasoning is the fact that section 27 could no longer serve as a
jurisdictional grant for the disposition of implied right cases in a
federal court. However, such claims still could be entertained in
the federal courts pursuant to section 1331 of the judicial Code as
actions "arising under" the federal law.3" Unlike the present judi-
cial interpretation, such an approach would not limit jurisdiction to
the federal courts and a state forum would be equally available."
that contribution from a third party defendant should be allowed in a lOb-5 implied
right action.
3 7 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 38 U.S.L.W. 2175 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1969).
38402 F.2d 294 (10th Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
39 Article III of the Constitution establishes the national judicial power over "all
cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States .... U.S. CONST. art. III. Congress implemented this power in the Judicial
Code, wherein it is provided: 'The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests or costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). Federal jurisdiction based upon a federal
question is determined by the properly pleaded portions of a complaint and it has been
said:
[Plaintiff] need not maintain even that some piece of national legislation
so provides, in so many words, the governing rule of substance; if it is his
position that his right to relief is granted by federal common law, whether
in connection with a statute or otherwise, jurisdiction in the national trial
courts will be supported. Mishkin, The Federal Question in District Courts,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165 (1953).
See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). See also Bergman, Reap-
praisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 McH. L. REv. 17 (1947); Chadbourn &
Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942).
40 Professor Loss also recognizes this possible construction. 2 L. LOSS, supra note
7, at 998-99 n.528.
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II. Is EXCLUSiVE Too ExcLusivE?
Given the existence of a viable theory to support the concurrent
jurisdiction rationale, the question arises whether the adjudication of
implied right claims in state courts would serve a necessary and de-
sirable purpose. This, in turn, requires an examination of the man-
ner in which implied right claims are treated under the present
standard of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Unlike the implied ac-
tions under lob-5 and 14(a), the express remedies provided in the
Act are directed toward proscribing specifically delineated conduct.
For example, section 9(e) cites specific conduct that constitutes a
violation of the Act if practiced with respect to securities registered
on national securities exchanges.41 Section 16(b) prohibits short-
swing trading of the issuer's securities within a period of less than
6 months and establishes a procedure for disgorgement of such
profits. 2 Damages for reliance on misleading statements contained
in a report or document required to be filed pursuant to the Act or
the rules promulgated thereunder by the SEC are recoverable under
section 18(a). In contrast, the breadth of the language in both
10b-5 and 14(a) has resulted in the use of these remedies for a
broad variety of purposes, such as to redress the rights of corporate
shareholders. 44  Indeed, much of the debate over whether there is
a "federal law of corporations" can be attributed to the develop-
ment of the implied right in such a manner.45 In view of the pur-
poses served by the implied right action, it is not surprising that
such claims are often accompanied by several state claims arising
out of the same transaction or series of transactions. A plaintiff
seeking to litigate such grievances will most likely prefer to bring
his suit in one civil action. Since he may decide to institute the ac-
tion in either a state or federal court, his ability to maintain the suit
in one forum may well depend upon how the courts interpret the
exclusive jurisdiction requirement.
41 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964).
42 15 U.S.C § 78p(b) (1964).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964).
44 See BahIman, Rule 1 Ob-5: The Case for its Full Acceptance as Federal Corpora-
tion Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 727 (1968).
4 5 For an excellent discussion supporting the growth of federal law in the corporate
area, see Fleischer, "Federal Corporate Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1146
(1965). The author indicates that federal law will not govern every aspect of an im-
plied right case, particularly the procedural aspects. Id. at 1167-72. See also Com-
ment, Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: The Basis and Breadth of the Federal
Remedy, 31 U. CM. L REV. 328 (1964).
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A. Implied Actions in State Courts
If a cause of action involves solely a claim under the Exchange
Act, there is no doubt under section 27 the action may be brought
in a federal court and any other claims made by the defendant
in such an action, even those grounded upon state law, may be
decided therein. However, many transactions involving asserted
Exchange Act violations also involve other alleged indiscretions,
including violations of state law such as breach of a corporate fidu-
ciary duty. In such situations, a plaintiff with two claims, one
dearly cognizable under state law and the other founded upon a
federal implied right, might seek access to a state court to litigate
both claims. However, his ability to litigate both claims therein is
severely limited by the present interpretation given section 27 by
the state courts. Based upon 35 years of operating experience under
the Exchange Act, the conditioned response of the state courts has
been to hold that section 27 requires a plaintiff to bring his im-
plied right claim in the federal district court.46  In fact, because of
myopic adherence to the exclusive jurisdiction requirement, state
courts have even denied defendants the right to raise alleged viola-
tions of the Exchange Act as a defense to an action brought under
state law.47  Faced with such a prospect, a plaintiff is forced
4 6 McCollum v. Billings, 53 Misc. 2d 661, 279 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1967);
Gallo v. Mayer, 50 Misc. 2d 385, 270 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mex., 272
N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1966); Levine v. Silverman, 43 Misc. 2d 415, 25 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); White v. Ludwig, 32 Misc. 2d 120, 223 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
aff'd inem., 253 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1964); MeKrut v. Gould, 16 Misc. 2d 326, 188
N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Mitchell v. Bache & Co., 52 Misc. 2d 985, 277 N.Y.S.2d
580 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1966). See 1A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 55 0.208[4],
0.213[2] (1965).
47 See Rueben Rose & Co. v. Davon Associates Ltd. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. Rep. 5 92,109, at 96,530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1967) (New York Supreme Court refused
to recognize the assertion of an implied right violation of the Act as a defense to a state
cause of action); Investment Associates Inc. v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del. Ch.
225, 48 A.2d 501 (1946), aff'd, 29 Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (1947) (section 14(a)
proxy violation could not be asserted as a defense to a charge of director election manip-
ulation. But see Gregory-Massari, Inc. v. Prukitt, 38 U.S.L.W. 2318 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 1968); Billings Associates, Inc. v. Bashow, 27 App. Div. 2d 124, 276 N.Y.S.2d
446 (1967); Staley v. Salveto, 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 318 (1963), wherein defendants were
permitted to raise as a defense to a contract action section 29(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 cc(b) (1964).
A possible justification for the position taken by these courts is the initial part of
section 27 which states: "The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) (emphasis added). If read
strictly, any violation of the Act's provisions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts and, therefore, no state court could properly consider any issue involv-
ing a violation of the Act. Two other considerations militate against such a liberal
reading.
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either ,to bring his implied right claim in a federal court and his
state claim in the state court, or to attempt to bring both claims in a
federal court.
B. Implied Actions in Federal Courts
When an implied right claim is brought in a federal court, the
jurisdictional basis for the action is either section 27 of the Act or
section 1331 of the Judicial Code. 8 However, a plaintiff seeking
to litigate both a state claim and an implied right claim in federal
court must also meet the test of pendent jurisdiction.49  Concep-
tually, this doctrine permits the federal courts to append the state
claim to the federal claim, thereby enabling the court to adjudicate
the claims together. After operating under the so-called "cause of
Because of the supremacy clause in article VI of the Constitution the federal
statutes operate essentially as a part of the law of each state and are as binding on its
courts as are the state constitution and laws. The Constitution of the United States,
the federal laws, and the federal treaties are by express declaration of article VI, section
2 of the Constitution the supreme law of the land. See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi
ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920). As such,
whenever the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States are involved in a state
court action, the state court is required to apply the national law. See Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698
(1942); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941). See also Note, An Examination of
Congressional Vesting of Federal Courts With Authority to Deal with State Matters,
20 NontE DAME LAW. 306 (1945).
Although both patent and antitrust actions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts [15 U.S.C. § 21(d) (1964) (antitrust); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964)
(patents)] state courts have long been required to decide questions of patent validity
and antitrust violations raised by way of defense. In Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke
Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897), plaintiff maintained that defendant was unable to raise the
illegality of patents as a defense to a state contract action. The Supreme Court said of
this contention:
The state court had jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject-matter as
set forth in the declaration, and it could not be ousted of such jurisdiction by
the fact that, incidentally to one of these defences, the defendant claimed the
invalidity of a certain patent. To hold that it has no right to introduce evi-
dence upon this subject is to do it a wrong and deny it a remedy. Section
711 does not deprive the state courts of the power to determine questions
arising under the patent laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of 'cases'
arising under those laws. 168 U.S. at 259.
See also 2 Loss, supra note 7, at 978; Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REv. 509, 510 (1957). Regarding patent
law, see Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 P.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964); Herzog v. Heyman,
8 Misc. 27, 28 N.Y.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 1894). Regarding antitrust law, see Bement
v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer
Co., 188 Misc. 929, 64 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946); af!'d, 281 App. Div. 668, 117
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d 844 (1953).
48 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
49 See 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTIcE & PROCEDURE § 23
(C. Wright ed. 1960); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962); Note, UMW
v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968).
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action" test which required that both claims be substantially related
so as to support a single "cause of action,"50 in 1966 the Supreme
Court, in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,5 enunciated a new stand-
ard. Pendent jurisdiction is now operative whenever the state and
federal claims are derived from "a common nucleus of operative
facts" and if the plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding."52 While the new definition appears
to increase the latitude of pendent jurisdiction,53 the Court was care-
ful to emphasize that there would be situations in which pendent
jurisdiction could not be invoked because the state claim would
"substantially predominate." 54  Although it is too soon to determine
whether this new standard will in all cases remove the hardship of
having to litigate related state and federal claims in separate forums,
it appears likely that the lower courts may still find cases involving
state and federal implied right claims which will not meet the pend-
ent jurisdiction test.
The recent case of Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc.55 illustrates this possi-
bility. In Weiss, shareholders of the corporation asserted that
the named defendants had conspired to waste the corporate assets,
engaged in ultra vires acts, and violated section 14(a) of the Ex-
change Act. Plaintiffs, uncertain of their ability to prove the ele-
ment of causation required in a section 14(a) action,56 amended
their complaint, omitting several defendants in an attempt to insure
diversity jurisdiction. The court held that even if the plaintiffs
could cure their failure to prove causation under section 14(a), pend-
ent jurisdiction would not lie since the federal and state claims
involved different defendants and focused upon transactions occur-
ring at different points of time, and thus did not arise out of a com-
mon nucleus of operative facts.
50 Under this test, pendent jurisdiction was present whenever "two distinct grounds
in support of a single cause of action were present," but not when the claims constituted
two separable causes of action. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1938). This test
was often applied inconsistently. See Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal
Securities Laws, 67 CoLum. L REv. 474 (1967). Compare Carliner v. Fair Lanes, Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965), with Walsh & Levine v. Peoria & E. Ry., 222 F. Supp.
516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Moreover, some courts failed to recognize this doctrine. See
Chashin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil
Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
5' 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
521d. at 725.
53See Note, UMIW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 657.
54 383 U.S. at 726.
55295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
561d. at 826.
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The only present avenue left for a plaintiff such as Weiss who
fails to meet the pendent jurisdiction test is to litigate his implied
right action in a federal court, and his state action in a state court.
Such a result, precipitated by the exclusive interpretation given sec-
tion 27, is both undesirable and cumbersome. The expense of two
trials, the possibility of incongruous remedies, and the potential
lack of uniform application of legal principles are all problems that
attend the splitting of such claims. Of course, the easiest method
of avoiding these difficulties would be to revise the requirements
necessary to meet the pendent jurisdiction test.57  But, given the
unwillingness or inability of federal courts to accomplish this task,




If concurrent jurisdiction is to facilitate a plaintiff's ability to
litigate his claims in one forum, there are at least two questions that
need to be resolved: (1) How would the state courts begin to
exercise jurisdiction over implied right cases? (2) Would obstacles
such as the defendant's right of removal to a federal court vitiate
the advantages of initially creating such a system?
A plaintiff asserting both an implied right claim and a valid
state claim in a state court could approach the court in two possible
ways. He might urge that the state court treat the action in the
same manner as other actions brought in a state court to enforce
violations of federal securities laws. Such an action would be anal-
ogous to an implied right action brought under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933,58 except that the 1933 Act expressly pro-
vides for concurrent jurisdiction.59 In deciding the federal claim,
the state court could use a "reverse-Erie" rationale, applying federal
substantive law in deciding the issue.60 In short, the state court
57 But see text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
58 See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.; 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd
in part, rev'd in Part, 38 U.S.L.W. 2175 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 1969); Belhumeur v. Dawson,
229 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Mont. 1964); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Osborne
v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
59 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1964).
60 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 2006. See also Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362 (1959); Testa v. Kart, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912); Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1551 (1960).
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would be entertaining a federal tort. The obvious reason that no
similar theory has been recognized under the Act is because of ad-
herence to the exclusive jurisdiction requirement. However, given
the argument that the implied right is a creature of federal common
law and therefore not burdened by the restrictions of section 27,61
there is no reason not to apply the "reverse-Erie" rationale.
A second alternative available in urging the state court to assume
jurisdiction over the implied right claim is to bring the action in
state law alleging that a violation of a federal criminal statute gives
rise to a tort action at state law. Such an action could be founded
upon the so-called "crime-tort" theory.6" Because the Act provides
for criminal penalties for violations of proscribed conduct, 63 as a
supplement to enforcement of the national policy against criminal
violations of the securities laws embodied in the Act, a state court
could find such conduct actionable under state law in a civil suit
for damages. The state court would, under this approach, be creat-
ing a new state tort.
The fact that state courts have been reluctant to fully endorse
the "crime-tort" rationale 4 serves as a practical limitation on the
success of implementing the second alternative. However, there is
some evidence that state courts are already utilizing a similar ap-
proach, albeit by indirection. In a number of cases, plaintiffs have
filed actions in state courts alleging purely state claims.6" They
failed, however, to recognize that they also alleged facts sufficient
to support federal implied right claims. After having their claims
It has historically been contended that when Congress provides for enforcement of a
federal claim in a state court that the parties must accept the limitations inherent in
state procedural law. Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178 (1944). However, the FELA
cases support the proposition that Congress has the power to control the incidents of a
state trial of a federal claim. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Fed-
eral Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 507-08 (1954); Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, supra note 60, at 1551 (1960); Note, Procedural Protection for Federal
Rights in State Courts, 30 U. GIN. L. REv. 184 (1961). This procedure is the reverse
of what the federal courts are required to do under the Erie doctrine. Erie -KR. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61 See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
6 2 For a general discussion, see RESTATEMENT [SEcOND] OF TORTS § 288 (1966),
which approves of the crime-tort theory. The comments indicate that whether the court
adopts and applies to a negligence action the standard of conduct provided by a crim-
inal statute or regulation, it is purely within the court's discretion. Id., comment d at
26.
63 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
64 See 2 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 986-87.
65 Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966); Connelly v. Balk-
will, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.
1960); Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).
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dismissed in the state courts, they then filed suit in federal court
based upon implied private rights. The federal courts dismissed
the actions holding that the elements involved in the state pro-
ceedings were sufficiently broad to include the federal claim and
that the principle of res judicata required that the suit be dismissed.66
Although conceptually it is possible to structure an approach to
concurrent jurisdiction at the state court level, such an alternative
is only desirable to the extent that it reduces or eliminates defi-
ciencies attributable to the present system of exclusive federal jur-
isdiction. Specifically, will concurrent jurisdiction reduce the pos-
sibility that parties may be forced to litigate their federal implied
right in a federal court and their state claim in a state court? The
answer in large part depends upon the ability of the defendant to
obtain removal of both claims from the state court under section
1441 of the Judicial Code. 7
The basic requirement for removal is that a civil action brought
in the state court could have been brought originally in a federal
court either under diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 8 If a
plaintiff bases his implied right claim upon the Act, either as a fed-
eral tort or as a new state tort, the federal question requirement will
be met."' Section 1441(a) allows removal of any civil action over
66 In Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd per curiam,
279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960), the Ohio concept of fraud was found to be broad
enough so that dismissal of plaintiff's state action was res judicata in his later federal
action under 10b-5; Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954), held that
the Delaware fraud action and an Exchange Act section 14 (a) violation for false and mis-
leading statements were sufficiently similar so that the plaintiff's unsuccessful suit in
the state court was a bar to the action in federal court upon principles of res judicata;
Boothe v. Baker Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1966), held that a complaint
was barred by a court-approved settlement of a derivative suit under New York law.
The federal complaint was for false and misleading statements under section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act. The Balkwill and Kaufman cases have been severely criticized. See
Note, Res Judicata." Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State Court
Determinations, 53 VA. L REv. 1360 (1967); Note, The Res Judicata & Collateral
Estoppel Effect of Prior State Suits on Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 69 YALE L.J.
606 (1960). For discussion of res judicata effects on state determinations in the patent
and antitrust areas, see Note, Judgments - Res Judicata - Effect of State Court De-
termination of Patent Infringement as Collateral Estoppel, 11 VAND. L. REV. 240
(1957); Note, Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel - State Courts Incidental Determi-
nation of Federal Anti-Trust Issue Does not Act as a Bar in Federal Action, 40 MINN.
L REv. 618 (1956).
6728 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
6828 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b) (1964).
(9 See Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d
Cir. 1968):
A case may "arise under" federal law, even though the claim is created by
state law, if the complaint discloses a need for the interpretation of an act of
Congress.... The word "laws" in § 1331 should be construed to include
laws created by federal judicial decisions as well as by congressional legislation.
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which the district court would have had original jurisdiction. 0
While it is clear that an implied right claim alone would be within
the court's original jurisdiction, the court in our hypothetical is be-
ing asked to litigate both a federal and state claim. Since section
1441(a) requires that the entire civil action be removed, this all-or-
nothing proposition forces the court to adopt the pendent jurisdiction
test in determining whether it has jurisdiction over both claims.71
Thus, a defendant seeking section 1441(a) removal where a state
claim is coupled with a claim related to the Act, either as a federal
tort or as a new state tort, would have to show that both claims
were of a type that "would ordinarily be tried in one proceeding"
and arise from a "common nucleus of operative facts." 72  To meet
the unitary proceeding requirement, the federal claim must be "sub-
stantial. ' 73  It is well established that a federal claim is "substan-
tial" if the federal court, without regard to the joined state claim,
would ordinarily assume jurisdiction over the claim. 74  It is highly
unlikely that a court could deny the "substantial" federal nature of
an Exchange Act claim, especially when reference to the Act is made
in the complaint.
However, with respect to the second requirement of section
1441(a) that the claims must "arise from a common nucleus of
operative facts," the answer is not so readily apparent. When the
federal and state claims involve different parties, or focus upon a
party's actions at different points of time in a prolonged transaction,
some courts have held that the claims are not derived from a com-
mon nucleus of operative facts.7 5 It is likely that state claims such
70 Section 1441(a) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embrac-
ing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
71 See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
72 Unired Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1968).
73 To meet the "substantial" test of section 1331, the claims must be "substantial
and related" within the meaning of section 1338(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964).
Section 1338(b) grants federal jurisdiction over "a claim of unfair competition when
joined with a substantial and related claim under copyright, patent, or trade-mark laws."
The precise meaning of a "related" claim under section 1338(b) is unclear. Compare
Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467, 483 (9th Cir. 1961), holding
claims "related" "if there exists a 'considerable overlap in their factual basis' and if a
substantial amount of the evidence of one claim be relevant to the other," with Powder
Power Tool Corp. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., 230 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cit. 1956), re-
quiring that the "federal and nonfederal causes rest upon substantially identical facts."
74 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
7 5 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
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as seizure of corporate opportunity, conflict of interest, and corpor-
ate mismanagement, when coupled with an implied 10b-5 or 14(a)
claim, would involve the conduct of several parties at different
points in time. If the court finds that such claims fail to meet the
pendent jurisdiction test, removal of neither the federal nor the
state claim can be obtained under section 1441(a), and both claims
must be remanded to the state court.
If the defendant fails to obtain removal under section 1441(a), he
may alternatively seek removal under section 1441(c). 76 Section
1441(c) permits removal of both claims when the federal and state
claims are "separate and independent.1177  The leading case constru-
ing this requirement is American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 7 8
wherein the Court concluded that "where there is a single wrong to
plaintiff.. . arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there
is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under §
1441 (c). ' 79 Because of the interrelationship in most implied right
actions between alleged violations of the securities laws and related
claims arising under state law, 0 it would seem that few attempts to
remove such claims under section 1441 (c) would be successful. Even
assuming that the claims would be unrelated enough to meet the
"separate and independent" standard, section 1441(c) would still
permit the district court to determine both claims.81 However, un-
like section 1441(a), section 1441(c) also permits the court in the
exercise of its discretion to "remand all matters not otherwise within
its original jurisdiction." 8  To the extent that the courts choose to
remand the state claim, the plaintiff's efforts to litigate his claims
76 Section 1441(c) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent daim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may re-
mand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1964).
77 Id.
78 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
79 ld. at 14.
80 See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
81The discretionary language of section 1441(c) states: "Mhe district court ...
in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction."
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964). See, e.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6,
11 (1951).
8228 U.S.C. § 14 4 1(c) (1964). The American Law Institute has proposed that the
original removing party have the right to have the entire case remanded to the state
court if the federal court chooses to remand part of the action under section 1441(c).
See ALI, STUDY OF THE DMSION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDiERAl
CoURTs 147 (1969).
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in one forum would be frustrated. Although some commentators
feel that failure of the federal courts to remand the unrelated state
claim would constitute a violation of the constitutional require-
ment for original jurisdiction, 3 there is case law supporting the
position that such exercise of discretion is constitutional.'
Although it is possible that a defendant's attempt to remove the
suit to a federal court would cause the plaintiff to split his action,
the likelihood of such an occurrence is limited. Removal under
section 1441(a) requires removal of both the state and federal
claims. Thus, there is no opportunity under this section for a de-
fendant to split the claims by removing to a federal court. Both
claims must be removed to the federal court or they must be re-
manded to the state court for determination. On the other hand,
if removal is obtained under section 1441(c), it is possible that the
claims would be split through the exercise of the district court's
discretion to remand any issue not otherwise within its original ju-
risdiction. However, the gloss placed upon the "separate and inde-
pendent" requirement of section 1441(c) makes it unlikely that
many cases would involve claims so unrelated as to meet the test.
For those cases involving claims not sufficiently related to meet
the pendent jurisdiction test of section 1441(a), and not sufficiently
"separate and independent" to meet the test of section 1441 (c), the
concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts would serve to permit
the plaintiff to have both his federal and state claims litigated in
one forum.
IV. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OR EXPANDED
PENDENT JURISDICTION?
Traditionally, implied right claims under the Act have been in-
terpreted to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Recently, however, there has been cause for substantial doubt over
whether this interpretation is dictated by either the legislative his-
tory of section 27 or the nature of the implied right. The Borak
opinion, as well as other recent cases, indicates that perhaps the im-
8 3 See Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Separate and Independent Claim or
Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1962); Moore & Van Dercreek, Multi-party,
Multi-claim Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section
1441(c), 46 IowA L. REv. 489 (1961); Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back
Door - Removal of "Separate and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66
HARV. L. REv. 423 (1953).
8 4 Breslerman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.N.Y. 1959);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 159 F. Supp. 738
(D. Md. 1958).
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plied right is a peculiar species of federal common law and, as such,
is not subject to the restrictions of section 27.
The development of the federal implied right has been accom-
panied by a gradual expansion of the substantive nature of the right
to where the action is now used to redress a variety of grievances
alleged by corporate shareholders. Concommitant with this expan-
sion has been the increased tendency for such actions to also include
questions of state corporate law. The exclusive federal jurisdiction
requirement has forced plaintiffs to litigate their cases in federal
court because of the strict adherence given the exclusivity standard
by state courts. However, in some instances, failure to meet the
pendent jurisdiction test denies the plaintiff the opportunity to have
both claims litigated in federal court. The pursuit of multiple
claims in different courts results in additional delay, great expense,
and the possibility of incongruous treatment of the claims.
To the extent that concurrent jurisdiction over implied right ac-
tions would serve to eliminate this deficiency attributable to the
present system, its effect would be salutary. Although it may be
suggested that the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts poses
a barrier to implementing such a system, an analysis of the mech-
anics of the removal provisions indicates that only in rare instances
would this be true.
As federal courts continue to expand the definition of conduct
actionable under the implied right provisions, such actions will in-
creasingly involve questions of state corporate law. The pressure
to litigate all the claims in one civil action, absent a concurrent
jurisdiction provision, is likely to result in an expansive reading of
the pendent jurisdiction test. This expansion could be accomplished
simply by recognizing the broad federal interest accompanying such
suits."5 The effect of such an expansion could, however, spell dras-
tic consequences for the very existence of a body of state corporate
law. Because of the relaxed service of process requirements in the
85 Indeed, there is evidence that the federal courts are extending the scope of pen-
dent jurisdiction without relying on the theory of superior federal interest. See White
v. Driscoll, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5j 92,191, at 96,908 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), holding that the district courts, upon a finding of pendent jurisdiction, have
power to enforce a shareholder's state-granted right to inspect corporate records. The
serosity of the jurisdictional finding is indicated by the court's acknowledgment that it
was difficult to discover any federal claim, and that the state claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and waste corporate assets were "far more extensive." Id. at 96,909.
See generally Coffey, Procedural Issues in Borak Cases, 2 REv. SEC REG. 969 (1969);
Lowenfels, supra note 50, at 486; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,
supra note 49, at 667.
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Exchange Act,8" through the use of pendent jurisdiction a plain-
tiff might force a defendant to answer state claims which could not
be asserted in a state forum due to service of process restrictions."
Moreover, since a larger number of appended state claims would be
decided in federal court, a true federal law of corporations would
develop and the need for a body of state law would gradually di-
minish. To promote the goal of uniformity in securities regulation
it might be argued that it is necessary to establish a federal common
law of corporations. However, uniformity need not be attained at
the expense of rendering useless the existing body of state corporate
law. Under the "reverse-Erie" rationale, state courts would be bound
to use federal substantive law in deciding implied right claims. In
addition, the decisions of the state courts would be reviewable by
the United States Supreme Court for errors in construing federal
law.88 Needless to say, the potential for the emergence of an all-
encompassing federal corporate law raises questions of federal-state
relations serious enough to merit consideration by Congress or the
courts of the benefits of adopting a system of concurrent jurisdic-
tion.*
861 5 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
87 See Scott, Federal-State Relations Under Rule 1Ob-5 Procedural Regulations, 23
Sw. L.J. 526, 529-31 (1969).
88 Bahlman, supra note 44, at 732-35; Note, Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L
REv. 1512 (1969).
* This Note was adapted from a student Law Review manuscript submitted by Joel
A. Makee during the Spring of 1969.
